Blue Danube arming question

If the RAF of the early sixties was like the RAF of my day then the combination would be changed whenever someone was posted out, and IIRC they were changed every six months as well.

Arcade wrote:

Other nuclear storage facilities (including some in the US) apparently made do with the Ingersoll 10 lever key lock system. I wonder why the facilities here required a combination locking system more often used for protecting data, comms and document vaults and areas?

From what's been discovered about how Barnham operated, no one person could get access to a core because they weren't given the combination to both the door and the safe within, a second person was needed.

I suppose a key would have compromised that principle fairly easily, unless they stored them in individual combination boxes as well...If that was the case why bother with the hassle and expense of a key in a combination lock, when you can just put the locks on the buildings with the same effect?

There is also an inspection building at Barnham that is fairly large that has the same manifoil lock on the main door and has core safes within the main part of the building, so that upholds that principle too.

I imagine changing the combinations on 58 doors and 58 safes (as at Barnham with the igloos and inspection building) was quite a feat, I remember it taking me an age to do just a couple at a time, albeit messing it most times

SJT1985;131676 wrote:

From what's been discovered about how Barnham operated, no one person could get access to a core because they weren't given the combination to both the door and the safe within, a second person was needed.

I suppose a key would have compromised that principle fairly easily, unless they stored them in individual combination boxes as well...If that was the case why bother with the hassle and expense of a key in a combination lock, when you can just put the locks on the buildings with the same effect?

There is also an inspection building at Barnham that is fairly large that has the same manifoil lock on the main door and has core safes within the main part of the building, so that upholds that principle too.

I imagine changing the combinations on 58 doors and 58 safes (as at Barnham with the igloos and inspection building) was quite a feat, I remember it taking me an age to do just a couple at a time, albeit messing it most times

And hopefully remembering to check that the new combination works at least twice, BEFORE you shut the door!

I seem to remember seeing a photo somewhere in the Barnham thread that showed a door with a Sargent & Greenleaf combination lock on it instead of a Chubb Manifoil?

SJT1985;131676 wrote:

From what's been discovered about how Barnham operated, no one person could get access to a core because they weren't given the combination to both the door and the safe within, a second person was needed.

I suppose a key would have compromised that principle fairly easily, unless they stored them in individual combination boxes as well...If that was the case why bother with the hassle and expense of a key in a combination lock, when you can just put the locks on the buildings with the same effect?

Basic "Two-Man Principle" rules have always been applied - "Each person must be capable of detecting an unauthorised act or incorrect action by the other". In addition, there was always an armed security guard present who had been face-to-face briefed by the custodian.

Dual-key locking has always been a security option and has often been used provided the locks met the relevant security standards. The keys would not be held on the same bunch or location.

superplum;131836 wrote:

Basic "Two-Man Principle" rules have always been applied - "Each person must be capable of detecting an unauthorised act or incorrect action by the other". In addition, there was always an armed security guard present who had been face-to-face briefed by the custodian.

At Barnham the RAFP I've interviewed are adamant there were never allowed to be in operations area, with the exception of getting access to one of the watch towers in the centre on a maintenance building and their inner gate picket. They were simply there for external protection rather than internal security. That said, the fissile material buildings were wired up to the guardroom via alarms on their doors, so I'm guessing that if no-one had called them to say "we're going to open igloo 57 up" they'd know something was up.

Top two pics are from a film of the Hurricane test in Australia.